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Introduction 
 Microfinance provides saving and lending services to the poor. It is not conceptually 
different from banking in the USA. People are able to save money at and borrow money from 
microfinance institutions. They are compensated for saving and charged for borrowing by an 
interest rate that compounds on savings or loans. It is different primarily in the magnitude of the 
financial transactions. Loans to the poor are much smaller on average than loans traditionally 
given by banks; these loans can be as small as $71. Also, because of their poverty, borrowers 
tend to have little or no collateral to secure loans (Murdoch, Dec. 1999). 
 The Grameen bank of Bangladesh, founded by Mohammad Yunus, was one of the first 
microfinancing institutions. He came upon a group of villagers that were unable to pay off their 
debt to a money collector and found that he was able to lend them what they needed out of 
pocket. Moved by this situation, he started a lending service that avoided the high interest rates 
that the traditional moneylenders charged. The moneylenders charge rates as high as 100% per 
month on the loans they give; the current average rate for the Grameen bank is around 79% 
annually. Lending to the poor usually means that a lender will not be able to get any collateral to 
secure the loan.  
The Grameen bank was able to solve the collateral problem by lending to “solidarity 
groups”. Solidarity groups are groups of five people that take loans out together where the 
groups are held responsible for each individual’s portion of the loan. It seems that the factor that 
makes solidarity groups work to keep repayment rates high is the social element of the solidarity 
group, rather than the enforcement of group repayment (Pankaj, 1996). Furthermore, the 
Grameen bank has been able to help poverty stricken women in a country that is traditionally 
male dominated. The bank serves 95% women and maintains a high repayment rate around 98%. 
The resulting lower bad debt expense helps to keep interest rates down. The model of the 
Grameen Bank has been copied numerous times with high levels of success (Hassan, 2002).  
 Microfinance has been hailed as having the means to end poverty in the world, but this is 
not a consensus in the literature. One important criticism of microfinance is that there is no 
empirical evidence to support the claims that microfinance actually improves the condition of the 
poverty stricken. Unfortunately, the data are not sufficient to analyze effects of microfinancing 
institutions on their customers (Hulme, 2000). Another criticism of microfinance is the high 
interest rate charged. Since each account is small in relation to the expenses incurred for 
maintenance of these accounts, costs are relatively higher for microfinancing, and higher interest 
rates must be charged to offset the higher costs.  Entrapment of very poor borrowers may also 
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occur.  Once a borrower takes a loan from a microfinance institution, the borrower may use all of 
his available income to pay off the loan, then needs to borrow again to survive. This can create a 
debt trap that keeps borrowers permanently indebted to their microfinance bank (Murdoch, 
1999b).  
Despite the numerous criticisms of microfinance, it seems that it is a worthwhile subsidy 
for governments to undertake (Schreiner 2003).  Most microfinance institutions, including the 
Grameen Bank, are government subsidized. There is some controversy surrounding the necessity 
of these subsidies. Some state that microfinance cannot exist without governmental subsidy, 
while others claim that it is possible for a non-subsidized version of these banks to exist. If 
governments are committed to subsidizing microfinance, understanding the correlates to its 
prevalence would allow governments to make more informed decisions about policy affecting 
microfinance (Morduch, 1999a)  
 In the literature, individual microfinance banks have been shown to be stable even in 
cases where their respective country’s economy is not (Rhyne, 2001), but the influence of 
instability and lack of freedom on the operation of these banks is not examined. We examine 
political indices that are commonly considered to have an effect on economic institutions, such 
as indices that measure levels of freedom and stability. We expect economic freedom and 
stability to positively correlate with the prevalence of microfinance institutions.  
 
Analysis 
  Data from eighty countries across five continents were gathered to predict the prevalence 
of microfinancing institutions by measures of freedom and instability. We used cross-sectional 
data for 2006.  Variable names, means and standard deviations are given in Table 1.  
The number of microfinance institutions is normalized by population for each the country 
then logged (lnMFIPOP). The indices for freedom are given on a scale from zero to 100. Higher 
ratings are correlated with higher levels of freedom, but the data should not necessarily be 
interpreted as ratio data.  Efscore is the overall score of a particular country; PropRights is the 
measure of individual property rights. A more thorough discussion of these indices can be found 
at http://www.heritage.org/index/PDF/Index09_Methodology.pdf.  PchEF is the percent change 
of the economic freedom score from 2005 to 2006, and serves as a rudimentary measure of 
stability. GDP is measured in purchasing price parity (PPP) per capita to capture the overall level 
of poverty in each country. The percent change variables are an attempt to capture instability in 
each country. POP is the population of the country, and POPdens is the population divided by the  
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Max Min Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. 
Efscore 79.3 40 57.4114 57.1 57.2 6.882549 
PropRights 90 10 36.5823 30 30 15.598 
PchEF 0.13801 -0.0936 0.01009 0.00759 0.04266 0.043727 
POP 1.3E+09 279912 5.9E+07 1.2E+07 - 1.92E+08 
POPdens 2650.55 4.68985 294.183 173.218 - 392.5583 
GDP 17300 731 5351.11 4521 - 4238.055 
lnMFIPOP 2.28448 -4.7829 -0.1275 0.07595 - 1.353186 
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land area of the country in square miles. The dependent variable, lnMFIPOP, is the natural 
logarithm of the number of microfinancing institutions divided by the population of that country.  
 Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis is used to analyze correlations between 
groups of independent variables and the dependent variable. All of the freedom indices are 
included ex ante; the model is pared using a stepwise algorithm in R.  
 
Table 2 
Regression Output 
Variable Estimate Std. Error Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -5.750 1.240 1.48E-05 
Efscore 0.127 0.026 7.53E-06 
PropRights -0.030 0.012 0.012 
PchEF -4.170 2.950 0.162 
POP -2.87E-09 6.37E-10 2.54E-05 
POPdens 6.27E-04 3.14E-04 0.049 
GDP -1.00E-04 3.24E-05 0.003 
R2=.4622, n=79 
 
 The model is tested for endogeneity using the Hausman test. The variables being tested 
for a feedback relationship are lnMFIPOP and GDP. If there is endogeneity, the parameter 
estimates and the standard errors will be incorrect. GDP is estimated using an OLS linear 
regression, and the residuals from this regression are used in the restricted model. If the residuals 
are statistically significant, the Hausman test shows that GDP is endogenous. The p-value for the 
residuals is .69, indicating that GDP is not endogenous and that no correction is needed for GDP 
in the restricted model.   
 The model is tested for multicollinearity using Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs).3
 
 If 
there is multicollinearity, it is possible that the standard errors are biased and may lead to the 
inclusion of variables that should be excluded from the model. 
Table 3 
             VIF Test 
Variable VIF Score 
Efscore 2.394 
PropRights 2.423 
PchEF 1.219 
POP 1.095 
POPdens 1.109 
GDP 1.380 
 
                                                          
3  The Variance Inflation Index (VIF) is calculated by regressing each of the independent variables by the 
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 The VIF scores show that there is no multicollinearity in the model. The standard errors 
are not biased, so no correction for multicollinearity is necessary. 
  The model was tested for heteroskedasticity using a LaGrange Multiplier test. If there is 
heteroskedasticity, it is possible that the standard errors are incorrect, which could lead to the 
inclusion of variables that should be excluded from the model. The null hypothesis for this test is 
that there is no heteroskedasticity. We find the p-value for this test is 0.0056969, indicating that 
the model has heteroskedasticity. To correct for this, robust standard errors are calculated.4
 
 
Table 4 
Robust Standard Errors 
Variable t-value 
(Intercept) 6.75E-05 
Efscore 5.90E-05 
PropRights 0.051 
PchEF 0.348 
POP 0.053 
POPdens 0.055 
GDP 0.002 
 
 PchEF is not significant when heteroscedasticity is corrected. This variable is removed 
from the restricted model. 
 The model is tested for spatial autocorrelation using Moran's I test.5
Table 5 
 If there is spatial 
autocorrelation, it is possible that necessary variables are being left out of the model. It can also 
cause the standard errors and the p-values to be incorrect. The p-value for the spatial 
autocorrelation test is 0.00000000133, indicating that there is spatial autocorrelation. To correct 
for the autocorrelation, a maximum likelihood estimation technique that accounts for spatial 
autocorrelation is used. 
Spatial Autoregressive Model 
Variable Estimate Log likelihood LR statistic Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 4.899 - - - 
Efscore 0.108 -117.430 20.060 7.52E-06 
PropRights -0.025 -110.400 6.000 0.014 
POP -2.60E-09 -116.780 18.760 1.48E-05 
POPdens 0.001 -110.010 5.205 0.023 
GDP -1.00E-04 -112.970 11.141 0.001 
Rho= 0.46072, LR test value=9.3278, p-value: 0.0022571, Log likelihood: -107.4035, ML 
residual variance (sigma squared): 0.86578, (sigma: 0.93048) 
                                                          
4  A full discussion of the use of robust standards errors can be found in “Using Heteroscedasticity Consistent 
Standard Errors in the Linear Regression Model” (Long and Ervin, 2000). 
5  Spatial autocorrelation exists when the residuals of a regression are spatially correlated. Spatial 
autocorrelation gives statistical problems similar to temporal autocorrelation. The Moran’s I test finds spatial 
autocorrelation using a spatial proximity matrix; the null hypothesis is that there is no spatial autocorrelation.  
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Discussion 
 In the final model, general economic freedom has a positive effect on microfinance 
activity. PropRights has a counterintuitive negative sign. Free market economic theory suggests 
that economic freedom encourages economic activity. There might be some correlation between 
the nature of public subsidization of many microfinance institutions and the negative correlation 
of property rights to microfinancing. If, for example, a country raises money to pay for the 
subsidy by property seizure, there would be some correlation in the amount of subsidy and the 
property rights index. Population is negatively related to microfinance. Because the number of 
microfinance institutions is used, the size of the microfinance institution cannot be considered in 
this analysis. It is possible that microfinance institutions expand rather than multiply to meet the 
needs of the poor so that population does not discourage microfinancing institutions from 
operating. Countries with higher population densities have higher levels of microfinance activity. 
Higher population density lowers transaction costs for microfinance activities and makes it more 
attractive to operate in densely populated areas. GDP is negatively correlated with microfinance: 
poorer countries attract microfinancing institutions. The instability indices did not prove to be 
statistically significant, so the annual changes in market freedom did not affect the prevalence of 
microfinance in the data. 
 The scope of this research is limited heavily by the availability of reliable data. Only data 
on number of borrowers and number of microfinance institutions were available for analysis. 
Having the amount of microfinance activity measured in the size of savings and loans made 
would be more desirable.  
 This data is self reported; it is subject to any bias that self reporting may cause among 
microfinance institutions. Another problem with the data for this project is the bias for the 
countries that had to be excluded due to lack of data. Afghanistan and Sudan had to be excluded, 
for example, which would seem to bias our analysis against countries that were engaged in war 
in 2006. Six out of nine countries that were excluded due to lack of data were African countries, 
which would also bias the data against Africa.  
  As more data are made available from microfinance institutions, more thorough analyses 
can be conducted. Certainly time series analysis would be useful in determining the positive and 
negative effects that microfinance institutions have on the countries in which they operate. Being 
able to support or refute the claims on microfinance's ability to end poverty would be useful. 
Determining the extent of the benefits of microfinance may enhance policymakers' ability to 
alleviate poverty.  
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The microfinancing institution data were gathered from 
http://www.themix.org/publications.aspx?level1=002-REG. 
 
Freedom Indices were gathered from The Heritage Foundation's website Index of Economic 
Freedom at http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads.cfm. 
 
For this project, indices were created to measure political instability from the Political Instability 
Task Force's datasets at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfdata.htm. 
 
Data for GDP and government spending were gathered from the UN's data website 
http://data.un.org. 
